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Most of the tort cases during the survey period do not involve
any significant changes in the law. Mindful of the necessity of
stability and predictability, and of a tradition of even-handed continuity, our courts have been naturally hesitant to upset established
rules. However, in a few areas (injuries to unborn children, application of the immunity doctrine to a minor whose disability is removed,
scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation) the courts have
been faced with new problems and changed conditions. In these
areas the decisions frankly accept responsibility for some development
of legal doctrine to keep it responsive to the needs of the times, thus
maintaining both creativity and continuity in the law of torts. So
the supreme court did not hesitate to say in its decision involving
harm to unborn children, "While we adhere strongly to the doctrine
of stare decisis, we believe even more strongly in the growth and
development of the law to the end that every party who suffers a
wrongful injury may have a remedy for redress thereof."'

I.

NEGLIGENCE

A. The Standard of Care
1. Minor Defects in Pavement.-In GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Lyle,2 the plaintiff parked her car between indicated lines in a
parking space maintained by the defendant grocery company as a
lessee. She took one or two steps after getting out of her car and then
slipped and fell as she stepped into a depression in the asphalt paving
of the lot. It was conceded that the plaintiff was an invitee, toward
whom the defendant had a duty of due care to keep the premises in
safe condition; the principal defense was that the defect was too
trivial, or too obvious, to constitute an unreasonable danger. There
was evidence that the depression was about twelve to fifteen inches
across, and from six to eight inches deep, and was located at a point
where customers normally would walk. The plaintiff testified that
she did not see the depression because it was in the shadow cast
by her car, and was of the same texture as the rest of the lot, with
no break in the asphalt to call attention to it.
Under these circumstances a verdict for the plaintiff was sustained.
With reference to the defense that the defect was trivial, the court
pointed out that the earlier cases do not turn solely on the depth or
height of a defect in the pavement or sidewalk, but on all the surrounding circumstances. It was concluded that under this test there
was no need to take the case from the jury as has been done in some
1. Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1962).
Cf. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAuv. L. Rav. 463 (1962).
2. 351 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
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of the sidewalk cases,3 on the grounds that the defect was too insignificant to be actionable. As to the point that the danger was too
obvious, the court found enough evidence to support a conclusion
that the depression was not plainly visible, with the result that the
plaintiff need not be held guilty of contributory fault as a matter of
law.
2. Prevention of Swells from Boats.-In view of the increasing
amount of boating activity in this state, it is interesting to note that
in an action based on the wrongful death act4 a federal court found
there was a duty to avoid causing waves or swells which may harm
another boat. In Byrd v. Belcher5 the court said that: "One operating
a boat who sees, or should see, another boat, whether moored or
navigating, in a position where damage to such other boat from the
swell or wave wash from the first boat is foreseeable, must reduce
speed and direct the course of the first boat away from the position of
the second boat."6 However, the court, acting as a trier of fact,
found for the defendant because of the absence of convincing evidence that defendant's boat passed in dangerous proximity to the
decedents craft, or that the wave which overturned the fourteenfoot craft owned by decedent in fact came from the defendant's boat
rather than from some other craft. With reference to jurisdiction, the
court found that where death results from a maritime tort committed
on navigable waters within a state, the admiralty courts may maintain
a libel in personam, when the state statutes provide for a wrongful
death action. The court applied the common law of Tennessee to
the action, including the principle that proximate contributory negligence would have defeated recovery if negligence on the part of the
defendant had been 'established.
3. Effect of Customary Failure To Protect Against Noise.-In con-

nection with proof of negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 7 it was asserted in Rubley v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.8
that the deafness of a switchman, characterized by his physician as a
nerve type loss of hearing, was due to exposure over a period of years
to noise from diesel engines. It was further alleged that the failure of
the company to institute a hearing conservation program and to
furnish the plaintiff with ear-protective devices, which an audiologist
thought should be used, constituted evidence that the defendant had
not used due care to furnish the plaintiff with a safe place to work.
3. See City of Memphis v. Dush, 199 Tenn. 653, 288 S.W.2d 713 (1956), 24
L. REv. 1047 (1957).
4. TENN. CODE AN. § 20-607 (1956).
5. 203 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
6. Id. at 648.
7. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958).
8. 208 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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It appeared, however, that this was the first claim of this kind by
any of the railroad's 16,000 employees, and that there was no indication of any similar claim throughout the entire industry. There likewise was no evidence that any railroad had inaugurated the hearing
conservation program advocated by the audiologist who testified for
the plaintiff. Finally, a railroad supervisor testified that the use of
ear plugs would increase the injury rate. Under these circumstances
the federal district judge held there was no substantial evidence of
negligence and granted defendant's motion to set aside a verdict for
the plaintiff, stating that the "defendant is not to be judged by the
standards that a sound expert would promulgate, subsequent to the
injury, but by customary standards recognized by the industry at the
time of the plaintiffs injury." '
This type of case presents difficulties. Two specialists, one a physician, the other an audiologist, indicated that the railroad had a sound
problem about which something should be done. If simple audiogram
tests would reveal that particular employees are suffering a hearing
loss and should be rotated or protected with ear-protective devices
which would filter out the damage producing noises, perhaps an adverse verdict in a case like this would help get the railroads in motion.
At any rate, in future suits it would seem unsafe to rely on the
points that no previous claim of this kind has been made or that the
railroads have not yet been apprised of this hazard. It is apparent in
this connection that the supreme court has gone to great lengths in
upholding jury findings of negligence under the federal act on the
basis of rather slender evidence.' 0 While in most situations customary
prudence is indeed ordinary prudence, occasionally "a whole calling
may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices." 1
B. Proof of Negligence

1. Res Ipsa Loquitur-(a) Start of Fire From Gas Furnace.-The
res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applied to a new situation in Southern
9. Id. at 804.
10. For example, in the recent "bug bite" case, Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
372 U.S. 108 (1963), a verdict for $625,000 was reinstated on the ground that a
jury could find negligence in the failure to clear out a stagnant pool from which may
have come an insect which apparently caused an infection eventually necessitating
amputation of the plaintiff's legs. That opinion makes it clear that the absence of
previous accidents of the same nature will not preclude a finding of negligence.
11. The J. T. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (failure of a tug boat line
to install radios from which it could have received weather reports). See also Nashville,
C. & St. L. By. v. Wade, 127 Tenn. 154, 159-60, 153 S.W. 1120, 1121 (1912),
stating that evidence of custom is not controlling, since "a customary way may be
the negligent way, and at last the jury must. determine whether under all the facts
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Gas Corp. v. Brooks.1 2 There the defendant had installed two thermostatically controlled gas floor furnaces in a church, along with a
storage tank for propane gas. After installation the furnaces were
lighted, all equipment was tested by defendant's employees, and
everything seemed to be working properly. When the switches were
off no gas was supposed to come into the furnace except enough to
burn the pilot light. The thermostats were self-energizing, and no
part of the furnace equipment was connected with the electric wiring
in the building.
Less than two hours after the defendant's employees left the church
it was discovered to be on fire and soon burned down completely.
Under these circumstances the court held that the case properly was
submitted to the jury, which found for the owners of the church,
under the res ipsa doctrine.
One traditional requirement for application of the doctrine is that
the harm be caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant. On this point the court stated that there was no
"suggestion that any of the equipment installed by the defendant
was in any manner tampered with after being installed by the defendant's employees and therefore, the defendant must be considered
as continuing in the exclusive control and management of said equipment at the time of the fire."' 3 With reference to another basic requirement for the doctrine, that the injury be of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur without negligence, the court considered
that an inference of negligence on the part of defendant could be
made in the absence of any explanation by the defendant as to how
the fire started. It was found that there was no conclusive rebuttal of
this inference by testimony that the gas-burning equipment was
properly installed, or by the testimony of a fire chief that the fire
started in the roof of the church rather than near the furnaces.
This decision may carry the res ipsa doctrine a little further than
earlier cases. In Martin v. Braid Electric Co.,14 for example, the court
declined to apply the res ipsa doctrine in a case where a fire may have
been caused by a defective electric fan. In a case from another
jurisdiction, Rafferty v. Northern Utilities Co.,15 the res ipsa doctrine
was applied when a fire had broken out shortly after the installation
of a gas furnace, but there was substantial evidence in that case to
show that the fire originated in the immediate vicinity of the furnace.
the motor was managed in such a way as a person of reasonable prudence would
have managed it."
12. 359 S.W.2d 570 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
13. 359 S.W.2d at 581.
14. 9 Tenn. App. 542 (M.S. 1929).
15. 73 Wyo. 287, 278 P.2d 605 (1955).
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In Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan,16 the court required for
application of the doctrine that "'the nature and circumstances of the
accident must be of such a character that there could be no reasonable
inference, but that the injury complained of was due to the negligence
of defendant.
. ."'17
More recent decisions, however, like the
present one, seem to regard it as enough in situations where tampering is unlikely that the accident be one which "does not usually, occur
without negligence" on the part of the defendant.' 8
The plaintiff was aided by a doctrine resembling res ipsa in Miller
v. Cincinnati,New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry.,19 a case arising under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act2 ° and based on negligence in
maintaining equipment. After finding that the plaintiff must, establish
actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition by the
employer, the court proceeded to considerably ease the plaintiff's
problem of proof by finding that once it was established that the
equipment was defective at the time of the accident and had been
in the custody of the plaintiff for some time prior thereto, then the
defendant had the burden of going forward with proof negating actual
or constructive knowledge of the defect. Pointing out that such
proof would be peculiarly within the possession of the defendant, the
court remarked: "Although this is not a res ipsa case, much of the
same rationale as would apply in a res ipsa loquitur case would
apply with equal logic to this situation."2 1 It was also pointed out that
the precise injury need not be foreseen; it is enough that the defendant "might reasonably have foreseen that an injury might occur
from the existence of the defective equipment.2 2
(b) Fall of Commercial Aircraft.-A few years ago the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur was applied for the first time in this jurisdiction to
the fall of a commercial aircraft, in Capital Airlines, Inc. v. Barger.2
The doctrine again was applied, to a somewhat different type of crash,
in Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd.24 The plane there involved
was equipped with only one automatic direction finder (A.D.F.) and
there was testimony that the most up-to-date aircraft were equipped
with two A.D.F.'s. More significantly, there was testimony that as
the plane approached Nashville its single A.D.F. was not functioning
properly. The pilot nevertheless left that city for the Tri-Cities Air16. 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721 (1942).
17. Id. at 417, 158 S.W.2d at 726.
18. Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36 Tenn. App. 469, 474, 258 S.W.2d 782, 784 (M.S. 1953).
19. 203 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
20. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958).
21. 203 F. Supp. at 112.
22. Id. at 113.
23. 47 Tenn. App. 636, 341 S.W.2d 579 (E.S. 1960), 28 TENN. L. REv. 282 (1961).
24. 355 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn.), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 371 U.S. 21 (1962).
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port, after informing another pilot that the plane's A.D.F. was "malfunctioning." As the plane approached the Tri-Cities Airport there
was snow and fog, so that an instrument landing became necessary.
The plane was cleared to land, but in response to subsequent inquiry
from the tower operator as to position and altitude, the pilot replied,
"'I am having trouble with my ADF. I didn't pick up the outer
marker, either aural or visual.' "2 The plane flew some twenty miles
east of the airport and crashed into the side of Holston Mountain.
There were no survivors.
A wrongful death action was brought by the father of a passenger
who had been killed along with her husband. A jury returned a
verdict for $145,000 compensatory damages, and $5,000 punitive
damages. This verdict was sustained as to the compensatory damages,
but not as to the punitive damages. With reference to the punitive
damages, it was held that while the pilot and his first officer were
negligent in undertaking to fly a plane that was not airworthy, "there
... [was] nothing to show such gross and wanton negligence on their
part as to evince conscious indifference to consequences,"2 particularly since "their own lives were at stake, and they evidently expected
to make a safe landing."27
In affirming the judgment for compensatory damages, the court
observed that the airline, as a common carrier, owed to its passengers
"a duty of the highest degree of care consistent with the practical
operation of the plane."m This duty extends to the equipment and
maintenance of the plane, as well as to its actual operation. Since two
A.D.F.'s were needed on a plane "to meet the highest skill of the
art,"29 and here not even the single one was operating properly, there
was ample evidence of negligence to take the case to the jury. It was
further found that the trial judge had properly submitted the case to
the jury under the res ipsa doctrine, on the authority of Capital Airlines, Inc. v. Barger. It was urged in that connection that the defendant lacked the exclusive control necessary for application of the res
ipsa doctrine because the aviation agency which operated the control
tower was giving the pilot instructions. The court rejected this contention, since the defendant's employees had exclusive physical
control of the plane itself, even to the point that they were free to
disregard safety regulations. It was further held that the plaintiff
did not lose the benefit of the res ipsa doctrine by the fact that he
alleged specific acts of negligence which he failed to prove.
The defendant raised- a jurisdictional issue based on the fact that
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

355 S.W.2d at 445.
Id. at 447.
Ibid.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 445.
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violations of regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board were alleged.
It was held, however, that the suit was based in substance on common
law negligence, with the violations of federal regulations merely
adding one more ground of negligence. Consequently the decision
did not turn on an issue of federal law and was not removable to
the federal court as a case under the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
2. Slippery Floor-When Notice Not Essential.-When a customer
in a store or other business premises falls because of some obstruction
or slippery substance on the floor, ordinarily it is necessary to establish that the defendant had notice of the condition, or that it had
existed long enough that the defendant should have discovered it.30
Where, however, the dangerous condition is traceable to the defendant or his agents, the issue of notice may be irrelevant, as illustrated by the recent decision in Kinser v. Rich's, Inc.31 There a bottle
of oily lotion had been placed on the cosmetics counter in order that
customers could sample its contents. They did so by pressing a
plunger to squirt some of the lotion on their hands. As the plaintiff
came up to the cosmetics counter she slipped, fell, and was injured.
She testified that after the fall she saw oily or creamy substances on
the floor. It was asserted that employees and customers of the defendant had caused the substances to fall on the floor from the sample
bottle. Recovery was allowed, with the approval of an instruction by
the trial judge that if the defendant "through the acts of its employees
caused this portion of the floor in its store to be slippery and dangerous, the question of notice was immaterial."3
The situation here is different from that in Hill v. Castner-Knott
Dry Goods Co.13 where the plaintiff slipped on a dress improperly
left hanging from a counter into the aisle of the store. There the
plaintiff failed to recover in the absence of notice because proof was
lacking that the dress had been left in the aisle by an employee rather
than by a customer. In the Kinser case, it was clear that the dangerous situation was created by the defendant's employees. Even though
some of the customers may have handled the sample bottle carelessly,
this would not place the result outside the risk created by the defendant's conduct, since a jury could find that such carelessness on
the part of the customers was foreseeable. While it may be customary
to permit a lotion to be sampled in this manner, and while customary
prudence generally is ordinary prudence, that is not always the case.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Bell v. F.V. Woolworth Co., 44 Tenn. App. 587, 316 S.W.2d 34 (W.S. 1957).
300 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1962).
I& at 902.
25 Tenn. App. 2930, 166 S.W.2d 638 (M.S. 1942).

19631

TORTS

Ultimately the question of whether
a foreseeable danger has been
34
created is one for juries and courts.

C. Result Within the Risk or Proximate Cause

1. Foreseeability of Rescue at Swimming Pool.-A swimming pool
accident led to an unusual suit in Dan v. Bryan.- The owner of the
pool, Sheriff Reeves of Memphis, was undertaking to pump it out,
using an electric pump lent to him by his friend Bryan. Some insulation on one of the wires attached to the pump was defective, but there
was no evidence that this fact was known to Bryan or to Reeves, who
had the pump checked by a electrician after borrowing it from
Bryan. While Reeves and Bryan were trying with much difficulty to
get the pump into operation, Reeves entered the pool and held his
hand on an iron pipe to which the pump was connected. About a
minute later, after Bryan had primed the pump and turned it on by
connecting an extension cord, Bryan saw Reeves lying in the water
face down. He was unable to pull his friend, a much heavier man, out
of the pool, and both Bryan and Mrs. Reeves called for help, thinking
that Reeves had suffered a heart attack. A neighbor, Dan, heard
the cries, ran to the pool and jumped in to render assistance. He
also was electrocuted.
The plaintiff, Dan's widow, brought an action for the death of her
husband against the estate of Reeves and against Bryan, alleging
negligence on the part of both Reeves and Bryan. The trial court
directed a verdict for the estate of Reeves, the pool owner, but let the
case go to the jury against the supplier of the pump, Bryan. The
jury found for Bryan, but it was alleged in that connection that there
was misconduct on the part of one of the jurors and on the part of
Bryan himself. On appeal it was held that a verdict should have been
directed in favor of both defendants. Referring to the testimony in
the case, the court stated that "not one line of it establishes any duty
on the part of either defendant Reeves or defendant Bryan towards
the deceased, Melwyn B. Dan, violation of which entitles Mrs. Dan to
a right of action."36 It was concluded that "even if we assume that
both defendants were guilty of negligence"3 a jury could not find
liability to Dan, the rescuer.
It may be that on its face this is not a strong case for application
of the danger-invites-rescue doctrine, although at least in the case
of Bryan, a supplier of restaurant equipment, including electrical
equipment, perhaps a jury could properly have found some lack of
34. See note 11 supra.
35. 354 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961), 30
36. 354 S.W.2d at 486.
37. Ibid.
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due care in his failure to discover the defective insulation, or the need
of a "ground" for the pump, or the need to disconnect the pump
before Dan entered the pool. In any event, the court's assumption
that even if Reeves and Bryan were careless, still there would be no
cause of action for Dan's death, is puzzling. The opinion refers to the
act of the rescuer as an intervening cause. There has been wide
acceptance, however, of the view that reasonable efforts to save another are not to be regarded as an intervening cause.38 As stated in a
leading case, "the risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born on
the occasion. The emergency begets the man."39 This general doctrine clearly has been accepted in Tennessee.40 It perhaps would have
been necessary to carry the matter a step further here, at least in the
case of Reeves, for he may have been careless only with reference to
his own safety. The court assumes that under these circumstances
any fault on the part of Reeves was carelessness only toward himself,
remarking that "he paid for that negligence with his life."41 There
now is considerable authority, however, "that a person who carelessly
exposes himself to danger... in a place where others may be expected
to be, does commit a wrongful act toward them in that it exposes
them to a recognizable risk of injury."42 To support the view that'
Reeves was under no duty, the court says that Dan was not an
invitee of Reeves, who already was dead at the time of the call for
help; but since Dan came to the premises in response to a desperate
call both from Mrs. Reeves and Bryan, he would seem to be something more than a mere licensee. Probably this decision is not intended to limit the "danger-invites-rescue" doctrine in cases where the
accident resulting from the carelessness of the endangered party is of
a less unusual character.
2. Misuse of Pistol Sold to Minor in Violation of Statute.-Another
difficult case concerning proximate causation or result within the risk
is Ward v. University of the South.43 There a university student,
Sawyer, had purchased a pistol from one of the defendants, a gunsmith. While Sawyer was "negligently and recklessly" toying with
the pistol in his dormitory room, he accidently caused it to fire, and
fatally injured another student, Ward. Suit was brought against the
38. PRossER, ToRTs § 49, at 277 (2d ed. 1955).
39. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
40. Mobile & O.R.R. v. Ridley, 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S.W. 606 (1905); Chattanooga
Light & Power Co. v. Hodges, 109 Tenn. 331, 70 S.W. 616 (1902); Williams v. Town
of Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274, 222 S.W.2d 607 (M.S. 1949).
41. 354 S.W.2d at 486.
42. BonixN, Srtunrs L-T T. LAw oF ToRTs 569 n.33 (926); accord, Butler v.
Jersey Coast News Co., 109 N.J.L. 255, 160 AtI. 659 (1932); Carney v. Buyea, 271
App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1946); Longacre v. Reddick, 215 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948).
43. 354 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 317 (1963).
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university and some of its officials for negligence in failing to enforce
its regulation prohibiting students from having firearms, and in failing
to prevent students from purchasing firearms from the defendant gunsmith located in a nearby town. With reference to the gunsmith himself, it was alleged that he was negligent in selling a pistol to a minor
in violation of law, which provides:
Any person who sells, loans, or gives to any minor a pistol, bowie knife, dirk,
hunter's knife, or like dangerous weapon, except a gun for hunting, is guilty
of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars
($100) and be imprisoned in the county jail, in the discretion of the court. 44

This negligence was asserted to be the proximate cause of Ward's
death.
It was held that demurrers with respect to both defendants were
properly sustained. The principal basis for the decision was that the
act of Sawyer was the sole proximate cause of the accident. In that
connection the court states that Sawyer "at the age of 19 and a sophomore at the University, was capable of comprehending the full import and consequences of his deed." 45 This case, like Dan v. Bryan,'
presents a question as to what harm is within the risk created by the
defendant's conduct. Since the default of the university was concerned only with a self-imposed regulation, the case against it does
not seem a strong one. With reference to the gunsmith, the matter
is somewhat less clear. The legislature chose to include within the
scope of the prohibitive statute all minors, including those close to
majority, and apparently one purpose of the legislation was to protect third persons from harm from the careless handling of dangerous
weapons by minors generally. Whether the intervening negligence of
Sawyer should be regarded as placing the result outside the risk depends on whether or not his conduct was foreseeable. 47 The Tennessee courts have been inclined to regard an intervening act which
involves deliberate assumption of risk as unforeseeable and as placing
the result without the risk,8 but sometimes careless or even reckless
conduct may be regarded as foreseeable.49 In favor of the gunsmith,
however, is the consideration that the legislature may not have
intended to impose the burden of a heavy civil liability as well as
criminal responsibility in the case of a sale to minors of advanced
age, at least in the absence of any allegation that the minor is in44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4905 (1956).
45. Ward v. University of the South, 354 S.W.2d 246, 250-51 (Tenn. 1962).
46. See pp. 889-90 supra.
47. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 447(a) (1934); PRossER, ToRTs § 49, at 272 (2d ed.

1955).
48. Ford Motor Co. v. WVaggoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1945).
49. Justus v. Wood, 348 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1961), 29 TENN. L. REv. 468 (1962).
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experienced or otherwise incompetent. A Georgia case leaving the
issue of proximate cause to the jury involved a considerably younger
child, age "about fourteen."50 As the court in the instant case points
out, the law does not require the defendant "to anticipate and provide
against what is unusual or unlikely to happen, or that which is remotely possible....-51
In view of Sawyer's advanced age, this accident does seem rather
unusual and in this type of case perhaps much is to be said for allowing flexibility of judicial action as to the effect of violation of criminal
statutes in establishing civil liabilty.52 The decision does not mean,
however, that the court may not in other situations where a statute
has been violated let the case go to the jury on the proximate cause
or result-within-the-risk issue, or even, in some cases, direct a verdict
against the violator of a criminal statute designed to protect a class of
persons against the type of harm which occurs.
3. PrenatalInjury.-A few years ago in the case of Hogan v. Me-

Daniel it was decided, in a case of first impression, that an unborn
viable child who failed to survive a traffic accident in which his
mother was injured was not within the protection of the wrongful
death statute-4 This year the court was faced, in Shousa v. Matthews
Drivurseif Service, Inc., S with a case where triplets were born alive
two days after a truck was recklessly driven into the rear of a car
occupied by an expectant mother. It was alleged that each unborn
child "was at the time riding as a guest en ventre sa mere in the
automobile operated by his mother."- It was further alleged that
each child received serious injuries from which it died soon after
birth. The trial court sustained a demurrer on the authority of Hogan
v. McDaniel.

This action was reversed by the supreme court. The decision in
Hogan v. McDaniel was restricted to its actual holding that the
wrongful death act "did not entitle the next of kin or parents of an
unborn child to sue for injuries sustained which brought about its
death before it was born." 57 In an opinion which carefully considers

recent decisions throughout the country and the views of various
writers,"8 the court concluded that a viable infant may, upon being
50. Spires v. Goldberg, 26 Ga. App. 530, 106 S.E. 585 (1921).
51. 354 S.W.2d at 250.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 286 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959). Cf. Wade,
Torts-1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 VAND. L. REV. 952, 957 (1962).
53. 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958). See Noel, Torts-1959 Tennessce
Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1350, 1365-66 (1959).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1956).

55.
56.
57.
58.

358 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1962), 30 TENN. L. REv. 309 (1963).
358 S.W.2d at 472.
Id. at 473.
2 HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 18.3, at 1030 (1956); PRossEn, TORTS § 36, at 175
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born alive, recover for prenatal injuries negligently inflicted, and consequently for wrongful death. The rule denying recovery was criticized as "contrary to that justice which law seeks to save and
promote."59
Since in the present case the infants were viable, that is, capable
of living outside the uterus, the decision naturally was restricted to
that situation. It may be, however, that liability will be extended to
a non-viable foetus, in accordance with suggestions in standard
treatises, since it is clear that a child is in existence and subject to
prenatal injury for a considerable time before it becomes viable. It
has been stated in a leading text with reference to the distinction
between a viable and non-viable child that "there appears to be no
good reason for the distinction, which will inevitably involve difficult
questions of proof."60
D. ParticularRelationships
1. Possessors of Land-Duty To Warn.-In Broome v. Parkview,
Inc.,61 the operator of a bowling alley was having some remodeling
work done. The contractor, to help maintain heat, had suspended a
non-transparent plastic curtain from the roof and had later removed
the wall behind the curtain. An invitee at the alley leaned against the
curtain, as she had in the past. Since the wall had been removed, and
the curtain provided little support, she fell into a construction area
behind the curtain and was injured.
It was held on appeal that a verdict was improperly directed in
favor of the proprietor and the contractor. After finding that both
defendants were under a duty to use due care for the protection of
business guests, the court found that there was substantial evidence of
negligence on the part of each defendant either in failing to correct
a dangerous condition or in permitting the use of the bowling alleys
without adequate warning. With reference to the principal defense
that the plaintiff had assumed an obvious risk, it was held that a
jury could find that this danger was not obvious, "in view of the fact
that proof showed that the curtain was originally hung over the solid
wall and permitted to remain there for several days before a portion
of the wall was removed, and in view of the fact that the curtain
(2d ed. 1955); Note, Pre-natalInjuries: Damnum Absque Injuria', 26 TENN. L. REv.
494 (1959); Note, Tort Actions for Injuries to Unborn Infants, 3 VAND. L. REv. 282,

287 (1950).
59. 358 S.W.2d at 476.
60. PnossFan, ToRTs § 36, at 175 (2d ed. 1955).

See also 2 HiRaE

& JAMEs,

TORTS § 18.4, at 1031 (1956), where it is said concerning the viability requirement that
"any such rule would involve the courts in serious and controversial questions that

should be encountered only if there is real need for it."
61. 359 S.W.2d 566 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962), 30 TENN. L. RE.v. 474 (1963).
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was opaque, was hung in front of the wall, and the wall could be
seen extending from behind the plastic sheet and continuing to the
62
rear of the building."
2. Landlords Duty Under Covenant To Repair.-The Tennessee
courts at an early date adopted the modem view that where a landlord covenants to repair premises, he is liable to the tenant and any
others on the land with the tenant's consent for harm caused by
dangerous disrepair.0 The recent decision in Browning v. St. James
Hotel Co. 64 applies this rule to a case where a defective air conditioner "iced up" repeatedly and leaked water onto a terrazzo office
floor. The case makes it clear that the landlord's duty extends not
only to the tenant but to his employees and to all who are "lawfully
on the premises." While the liability of a landlord who agrees to
repair is restricted to situations where he has reasonable notice of
the defect and a chance to repair,5 here it was evident that the
landlord knew of the dangerous condition for he had sent a man to
mop up the water, and his manager had been advised that some
repairs made shortly before the plaintiff's fall might not correct the
difficulty unless additional controls were installed.
Under these circumstances it was decided, reversing the trial court,
that a jury could find lack of due care by the landlord in failing to
remedy this situation. It further was held that the trial court had
improperly found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The issue of contributory negligence ordinarily is left
to the jury, and in this particular case, where the plaintiff was an
outside salesman who visited the premises for only a short time each
day it seems clear that a jury could find freedom from contributory
negligence unless, as the court remarks, there is an "absolute duty on
every person to look to see that every step will be safe.... ,,GIf that

duty were imposed, it would become practically impossible to recover
in a slip-and-fall case.Y
II.

CONCURRENT CAUSES-CONTRIBUTION

The question of what conduct constitutes concurrent negligence
was raised in Nichols v. Givens.6 There the plaintiff was a passenger
62. 359 S.W.2d at 568.
63. Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87
(1916); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 357 (1934).
64. 355 S.W.2d 462 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
65. See Noel, Landlord's Tort Liability in Tennessee, 30 TENN. L. REV. 368, 373
(1963).
66. 355 S.W.2d at 464.
67. See McBrown v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 29 Tenn. App. 13, 193 S.W.2d
92 (E.S. 1945).
68. 358 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
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in a car driven by Givens. When he came to a highway stop sign,
Givens ran somewhat past the sign, and then suddenly came to a stop
or a near stop. Charleston, the driver of the immediately following
car in a line of traffic, thinking that Givens was going to continue,
looked up the highway to see if anything was coming, failed to
see that Givens had stopped, and ran into him. There was testimony
that Givens, after getting out to inspect the damage, negligently
backed his car into the Charleston car before driving away. The
plaintiff, who suffered neck and back strains, secured a verdict and
a judgment against both defendants.
Givens appealed on the ground that even if he did back into the
Charleston car, this was an entirely separate accident and not concurrent negligence. Since there was evidence that Givens was negligent in connection with the original collision, and the jury had
returned a general verdict against both defendants, which may have
been based on their undoubtedly concurrent negligence at the time of
the original accident, the issue of whether or not the negligence
involved in the second accident was sufficiently concurrent for joint
liability does not seem to have been squarely presented, for under
Tennessee law concerning general verdicts the verdict could be
supported by the negligence in connection with the original collision. In affirning the judgment, however, the court quoted with
approval a statement from an earlier case that each defendant is
liable for the entire harm where the negligence is "concurrent or
successive."70 So apparently even if Givens had been negligent only
with reference to the second accident, it would be enough for joint
and several liability for the entire harm that
each party substantially
1
contributed to a single indivisible injury2
With further reference to concurrent torts, a significant federal
court decision, Huggins v. Graves,72 allows contribution between joint
torifeasors without allegations that the party seeking contribution
was guilty only of passive negligence and that the party from whom
the contribution is sought was guilty of active negligence. This case
is more fully discussed in another part of this Survey.73 It should
be noted here, however, that the decision interprets the well known
4 as not limited to
Tennessee decision in Davis v. Broad Street Garage"
active-passive negligence situations, but rather as allowing contribu69. See Tracy v. Finn Equip. Co., 290 F.2d 498 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
26 (1961).
70. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Pewitt, 44 Tenn. App. 572, 579, 316 S.W.2d 17 (M.S.
1958).
71. PRossER, ToRTs § 45, at 226 (2d ed. 1955).
72. 210 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), 30 TENN. L. 11Ev. 456 (1963).
73. Wade, Restitution-1962 Tennessee Survey, supra p. 857, at 860-63.
74. 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950), 21 TEN. L. REV. 672 (1951).
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tion between joint tortfeasors in negligence cases generally. In
that connection the court quotes the following significant statement
from the Davis case: "Upon reconsideration and further thought the
majority of this Court holds that the rule of law expressed in the
majority opinion should be the law of Tennessee and not just applicable to the facts of the instant case. We feel that justice, right
and equity demand this conclusion." 75 The opinion reflects a careful
analysis of numerous Tennessee decisions and of the views of various
commentators and seems clearly to establish that this jurisdiction now
definitely has set aside the old rule against contribution. No one is
likely to mourn its departure, for as Prosser remarks:
There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the

entire burden of the loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shoudered onto one alone, according to the
accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance,
the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer,
while the latter goes scot free.7 6

Ill. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-STANDARDS AND PROOF
A. Duty of Guest in Car
The duty of a guest in a car to exercise due care for his own

protection was involved in Bray v. Harwell.17 There the defendant
invited the plaintiff and one Briscoe to ride in his car, on which he
had just installed a new air jet. There was contradictory testimony
as to whether defendant said he was going to test the car, or test its
speed. Immediately after starting, the defendant pushed the accelerator to the floor and soon reached a speed of seventy miles per
hour. Briscoe, seated between defendant and the plaintiff on the
front seat said, "Harwell, are you scared"?7 The plaintiff replied,
"Yes, I wish he would slow down.'7 9 The defendant testified that
he did slow down somewhat, although he still covered the six-tenths
of a mile from his point of starting to the place of the accident in
forty-five seconds.
On appeal from a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, the issue
was whether or not the plaintiff was barred by contributory negligence
as a matter of law. The court noted that a guest in a car ordinarily
has the duty to protest when he sees that the driver is acting carelessly, but it proceeded to hold, as in most cases of this type, that the
75. 210 F. Supp. at 102.
76.
77.
78.
79.

PRosssa, TORTS § 46, at 248 (2d ed. 1955).
360 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
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contributory negligence issue was properly submitted to the jury.
The driver may have heard the plaintiff's statement to Briscoe, and
in view of the shortness of the ride, the plaintiff may not have been
under a duty to voice a second protest, particularly since the driver
himself testified that he did reduce his speed. It was further held
that it was not inappropriate to instruct the jury that where a driver
is proceeding properly it is not negligence to fail to speak where
"the driver suddenly commits some act of negligence before the
guest has time to protest or give warning... ."8 This instruction was
regarded as having some applicability to the situation involved because of the extremely short period of the entire ride for which the
plaintiff was taken.
B. Assured ClearDistance Rule
There were three cases during the survey period which involved
the assured clear distance rule. In general this rule requires that a
motorist must not operate his car at so great a speed "that he cannot
bring it to a standstill within a distance that he can plainly see defects or obstructions ahead of him."8 ' Modem traffic conditions, however, continue to make the rule one of decreasing significance, as is
brought out in the current decisions. In Fontaine v. Mason Dixon
Freight Lines, 82 a truck going up a mountain had stopped on the
wrong side of the highway, just below a sharp turn. The plaintiff,
descending the mountain, rounded the curve and saw the truck in
front of her, completely blocking her side of the highway. The other
side of the highway likewise was blocked by a car proceeding up the
mountain. Under these circumstances the plaintiff was unable to
avoid a head-on collision with the truck. The trial judge, acting as the
trier o fact, found that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law under the assured clear distance rule
and dismissed the suit.
This dismissal was reversed on appeal. One ground for the decision
was that the assured clear distance rule does not apply when the
motorist encounters a situation which he has no reason to expect.
It was stated in that connection that "a motorist has a right to assume
that his passage will not be blocked by the illegal stopping or parking
of another vehicle on the wrong side of the highway, especially in
such close proximity to a sharp curve on a much traveled highway."83
4 There
The authority most in point was Halfacre v. Hart.8
the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 63.
Faulk v. McPherson, 27 Tenn. App. 506, 511, 182 S.W.2d 130 (W.S. 1943).
357 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
Id. at 634.
192 Tenn. 342, 241 S.V.2d 421 (1951), 22 TENN. L. REv'. 435 (1952).
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court simply held that the case should go to the jury on the issue of
contributory negligence and that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In the present case it was
held that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment. This was because
the defendant had consciously violated traffic laws and testified that
he realized he was "taking an awful chance." He therefore was held to
be guilty of gross negligence, with the result that even if the trier of
fact should find contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
still this would not bar her recovery. 5
Likewise in Garner v. Maxwel the assured clear distance rule
did not prevent recovery by a driver, in this case a highway patrolman, who ran into an illegally parked tractor-trailer. The rig had become disabled and was left on the highway with the lights turned off
and only one reflector in front of, and one behind, the vehicle, instead
of the three reflectors or lights required by statute8 7 The opinion refers
to the original rule laid down in West Construction Co. v. White,88

that the failure of a plaintiff to stop his car within the distance illuminated by his headlights amounts to contributory negligence as a matter of law, but the court notes that subsequent decisions have
considerably modified this rule. It was indicated that under these
earlier cases the driver in the approaching car has the right to assume
that no obstruction of this character lies in his path unless he sees
the clear and inescapable warning required by statute. In this case,
as in the one involving the truck parked near the curve, the decision
did not actually turn on whether or not the assured clear distance rule
should be applied; even if it had been applied the plaintiff would
have recovered because the defendant was guilty of more than ordinary negligence. Referring to the failure to provide the lights or
reflectors as required by statute and the substantial delay in securing
a wrecker, the court found that this conduct supported a conclusion
that the "defendants were guilty of such gross negligence as to
deprive them of the right of relying on the defense of contributory
negligence." 89
The assured clear distance rule also was invoked in Brinkley v.
Gallahar,90 where the defendant had erected highway barricades to
channel traffic into a newly constructed section of the highway.
The plaintiff's car struck the barricade and plunged over a steep bank.
The jury found that the barricades were so constructed as to consfitute a dangerous condition in the absence of an adequate warning
85. Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 178 S.W.2d 756 ( 194:3).
86. 360 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. App.W.S. 1962).
87. TE N. CoDE ANN.§ 59-919 (1956).

88. 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S.W. 301 (1914).
89. 360 S.W.2d at 66.
90. 359 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. App. E.S. -1962).'
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and that the lights and signs provided did not constitute such a warning. The plaintiff recovered for personal injuries and property
damage. On appeal the court found substantial evidence to support
this finding., The principal issue was whether or not the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law under the assured
clear distance rule. In holding that he was not, the court referred to
the language in Strickland Transportation Co. v. Douglas" stating
that the rule did not apply "where the motorist encounters a dangerous situation which in the exercise of reasonable care he had no reason
to expect... ,,9" It was considered that the present case was taken out
of the rule by the fact that a curve prevented the lights of the plaintiff's car from shining on the barricades and by the misleading effect
created by lighting the barricade furthest from the motoring public
while other parts were unlighted. The presence of mud on a wet
highway, making it slippery, was an additional ground for not applying the rule in this case and leaving the issue of contributory negligence to the jury.
These three cases, along with other recent decisions, 3 illustrate
that under modem traffic conditions the number of situations in which
the assured clear distance rule can safely be relied on as a defense is
steadily decreasing.
C. Effect of Violation of Statute-Remote ContributoryNegligence
The troublesome question of the effect of violation of a criminal
statute on the plaintiff's right to recover arose in Chandler v. Nolan. 4
There the plaintiff's son, age fourteen, was riding his bicycle along
the highway about dusk. He did not have a headlight and was violating a statute which required a headlight half an hour after sunset. A
motorist approaching from the opposite direction undertook to pass
a pickup truck. As he came abreast of the truck his left front fender
struck the bicycle and the rider was killed instantly. There was
substantial evidence to show that the motorist was guilty of violating
a forty-five mile an hour speed limit and a statute prohibiting passing
except where the left lane is clear. The trial judge held, however,
that this negligence could not lead to liability because the conduct of
the boy in violating the statute requiring headlights constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. Reliance was placed on
Donaho v. Large 5 where a pedestrian ,who violated the statute
requiring him to walk facing the traffic was found guilty of contribu91. 37 Tenn. App. 421, 264 S.W.2d 233 (W.S. 1953).

92. 359 S.W.2d at 861.
93. See Noel, Torts-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAmn. L. REv. 1350-54 (1959).
94. 359 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).

95. 25 Tenn. App. 433, 158 S.W.2d 447 (E.S. 1941).-
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tory negligence as a matter of law.
On appeal it was held that while the cyclist's violation of the
statute was negligence per se, the case should have been submitted
to the jury on the proximate cause issue, particularly since the jury
might have found simply "remote contributory negligence which
would only mitigate damages."9 6 This action was taken on the
authority of Adanw v. Brown97 and Standridge v. Godsey. 8 Both
these cases hold that even where the plaintiff is found guilty of
negligence per se in violating a traffic law, the case may still present
an issue for the jury on the proximate causation point.
It would seem that the effect of the doctrine that violation of a
statute designed to protect a particular class of persons from a particular hazard constitutes negligence per se is somewhat softened by
decisions of this kind permitting the case to go to the jury under
the proximate causation concept. Of course if violation of the statute
is not a cause in fact of the injury, the violation is not significant.
Where, however, there is cause in fact and the injury is one of the
kind the legislature obviously had in mind, the accident would seem
to be a proximate result of the statutory violation, or a result within
the risk created by not obeying the law in question.
Another way to handle the problem of statutory violation would be
to say that violation of a criminal statute may, rather than must, be
regarded as negligence per se by the court, depending on all the
circumstances. This would leave room for a desirable flexibility on
the part of the courts in handling this problem.9 9 So in cases like the
present one where negligence of the other party seems considerably
more serious than that of the violator of the statute, a just result may
be reached either by holding that violation of the statute is only
evidence of negligence or, if negligence must be found by uniform
application of the negligence per se doctrine, by submitting the
case to the jury on the issue of cause in fact.
The Tennessee doctrine of remote contributory negligence also
provides for flexibility by permitting the jury to allow the plaintiff to
recover, but in a diminished amount, if the plaintiff's statutory violation is found to be only a remote cause of the accident. Another
case in which the doctrine of remote contributory negligence arose
was Evans v. Mahal.00 There the plaintiff was a rider in a truck which
collided with a car owned by one of the defendants and driven by
the other, who recently had given the plaintiff a temporary job skid96. 359 S.W.2d at 594.
97. 37 Tenn. App. 258, 262 S.W.2d 79 (E.S. 1953).
98. 189 Tenn. 522, 226 S.W.2d 277 (1949).
99. See RESTATEfiENT (SEcovD), ToRTs § 286 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959), § 469(2)

(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
100. 300 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1962).
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ding pulpwood. The plaintiff recovered and the only issue on appeal
was whether the trial court had erred in refusing to charge on the
subject of remote contributory negligence. The pretrial hearing and
the pretrial order indicated that contributory negligence would be an
issue, but there was no reference to remote contributory negligence.
There was no evidence that the plaintiff, a migrant farm worker who
lived at the soldier's home, was guilty of any kind of contributory
negligence in not telling his employer how to handle the truck at the
time of the collision, when judgment and experience in driving were
crucial. Under these circumstances the court held that no error had
been committed in refusing to give the requested charge, stating: "We
are not persuaded, and do not believe that it is the rule in Tennessee
that in every negligence case, it is necessary to charge the jury on
the possible remote contributory negligence of a plaintiff, especially
where the jury finds him guilty of no negligence whatever." 1 1 Apparently all this case holds is that where there is no substantial evidence of remote contributory negligence, it is not necessary to charge
the jury on the subject. Otherwise it is established that the charge
must be given, apparently even in the absence of a request on the
subject.102
IV. WRONGFuL DEATH
A. Suit Against Subsequently EmancipatedChildRemoval of Family Immunity
The case of Logan v. Reeves'03 is one of first impression involving
the application of the family immunity doctrine to a wrongful death
action. The defendant, while an unemancipated minor, was driving a
car in which her mother was riding as a guest. The mother was killed
when the car collided with a truck at an intersection due to the
alleged negligence of the daughter. Within a year after the accident,
the daughter became completely emancipated by marriage and by a
court decree. 104 The administratrix of the deceased's estate brought
suit under the wrongful death act. A demurrer to the complaint was
sustained by the trial judge, but the supreme court reversed, holding
101. Id. at 196. The court also observed that since the doctrine of remote contributory negligence is peculiar to Tennessee, and "has aspects that have often perplexed the trial courts of that state, as well as leading authorities on the law of torts
(see 22 TENN. L. REv. 1030, 1038 (1952)), we attach importance to the circumstances
that the district court, in ruling upon this question, had been an experienced practitioner in the law of that state, and has, for a number of years, been an experienced
member of the federal judiciary of Tennessee." Id. at 197.
102. McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 341-43, 229 S.W.2d 505 (1950).
103. 209 Tenn. 631, 354 SAV.2d 789 (Tenn. 1962), 29 TENN. L. REv. 595 (1962),
48 IowA L. REv. 748 (1963).
104. See TEN. CODE A~z: § 23-1201 (1956).
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that an action for the wrongful death of a parent caused by the
negligence of his unemancipated minor child may be maintained by
the parent's administratrix after the child has become emancipated.
It seems clear that if this suit had been brought before the minor
defendant had become completely emancipated, it would have been
barred by the family immunity doctrine. The rule which excludes
actions between parent and child for personal torts is one that has
become well established in most jurisdictions, including Tennessee. 10
The chief grounds relied on to support this immunity are that an action between parent and child would disturb domestic tranquility,
and at least where the suit is brought by the child, would disturb
parental discipline and control. In this particular case, however,
it was clear that neither of these reasons applied, since the family
relationship and parental control both had been severed by the
mother's death and also had been terminated by the subsequent
emancipation of the child. The court concluded that since the sole
reason for the immunity was to protect the family relationship, it
followed "that when the reason ceases, the rule ceases; and that the
reason fails and the rule does not apply where the family relationship
has been severed or terminated." 10 6
The opinion seems to emphasize the termination of the relationship
by the complete emancipation of the child somewhat more than the
severance of the relationship by death. This suggests that even if
the mother had not died, she could have maintained the action upon
the emancipation of the child.10 7 That conclusion is further supported
by the court's distinguishing Turner v. Carter,08 where the administrator of a deceased parent was not allowed to sue a minor son for
wrongful death, on the ground that the son "had not become completely emancipated. .

. ."109

It might be added that it still is the

prevailing rule that the parent-child immunity will bar a wrongful
death action in the ordinary situation where the child has not become
emancipated, although there is a growing minority of courts holding
the other way on the ground that the relationship is destroyed by
0
death."
It was argued by the defendant that the subsequent emancipation
of the child could not relate back and "breathe the breath of life into
this claim." This argument might have merit in the case of the
105. Ownby v. Kleyhanumer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); McKelvey v.

McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); PRossER, TORTS § 101, at 675-76 (2d
ed. 1955).
106. 209 Tenn. at 636, 354 S.W.2d at 791.
107. See PRossER, ToRTs § 101, at 676 (2d ed. i955).
108. 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1936).
109. Ibid.
110. Dunn, Parent-ChildTort Actions, 12 CLEV. MAn. L. REv. 339, 343 (1963).
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immunity between husband and wife."' With respect to parent-child
actions, however, the court regarded the immunity as procedural, with
the result that a right of action did arise, but the right was "merely
prevented by the public policy of prosuspended and its enforcement
2
tecting the family relation.""
This decision is in accord with the current tendency to restrict the
family immunity doctrine. That doctrine is under attack partly because of changed conditions resulting from the presence of insurance.
A standard treatise states:
If a recovery can be permitted without disrupting the family tranquility, it
ought not to be refused because an insurer will thereby be rendered

liable on his contract when he would otherwise not be liable, and the fact
that his liability is the very fact which prevents the recovery by the
parent or child from disrupting the family peace is an immaterial factor
in the case. 113

It may be recalled in this connection that the supreme court recently
refused to extend the immunity doctrine to a suit involving unemancipated minor brothers, even though the net result was to diminish
the parent-child immunity. The court permitted the administrator of
the deceased boy to bring a wrongful death action against the unemancipated minor brother, even though the parents were the statutory beneficiaries of the administrator's action." 4 While there is a
risk of collusion in family suits, there are methods of detecting fraud;
it seems unwise to bar all family suits, including ones where there
are no indications of collusion, by a general immunity doctrine. Of
course if an insurance company does not wish to insure against the
risk of family suits, on the ground that the fraud problem is too
difficult to cope with, it can easily exclude such suits from the coverage of the policy. Such an exclusion will be protected even from
indirect attack, as shown by the recent decision in Morris v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." 5 There an accident in
which a husband negligently injured his wife had occurred in Arkansas, where the immunity no longer exists in the case of suit by a wife
against her husband. The insurance company, however, had excluded
this type of case from the coverage of the policy. It was assumed
that a third party involved in the accident also was liable to the wife,
and that under Arkansas law there was a right of contribution or
111. Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908 (1959), 27 TENN. L. REv. 422
(1960).
112. 209 Tenn. at 637, 354 S.W.2d at 792.
113. HARPER & Jmms, TonTs § 8.11, at 649 (1956). See also PRossER, ToRTs §
101, at 676-77 (2d ed. 1955).
114. Herrell v. Haney, 207 Tenn. 532, 341 S.W.2d 574 (1960), 28 TENN. L. REv.
419 (1961).
115. 360 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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indemnity against the insured husband. Since, however, the policy
excluded coverage in case of family suits, it was held that the husband's insurance company was not even obliged to pay the costs of
defending the third party's claim against the insured husband for
indemnity or contribution.
B. Suit by Illegitimate Child
Another new point with reference to the Tennessee Wrongful
6

Death Act was raised in Dilworth v. Tisdale Transfer & Storage Co."

The plaintiff, a minor, brought suit by his next friend for the wrongful death of his putative father, who had acknowledged the plaintiff
as his son and had contributed to his support. A demurrer was filed
on the ground that an illegitimate child cannot bring an action under
the statute. Since the deceased left no will, it was clear that under
the act the right of action passed "to his children.""1 7 It was held

that the plaintiff could not recover.
It is difficult to see how this result could be avoided. Earlier cases
have held that the wrongful death act, with its provisions for recovery by designated persons, "is in the nature of statutes providing
for the descent and distribution of estates. . ".."18
As to the designated beneficiaries, it is provided that the amounts recoverable
under the act shall be distributed, free from the claims of the creditors
of the deceased, "as in the case of the distribution of personal property."19 The statute providing for the descent of personal property
states that where there is no surviving husband or wife, the personalty descends "to the children,'
thus paralleling the provisions of
the wrongful death act concerning who may bring the action. With
respect to statutes of descent and distribution generally, it is well
settled that these do not apply to illegitimates "unless they are
embraced by its terms or by necessary implication,"' 2 ' and it has
been more specifically held that an illegitimate child cannot inherit
from its putative father.' 2 Under these circumstances, while the
court expressed sympathy with the trend to relax the harsh rules of
the common law with respect to illegitimate children, it saw no way
to permit a child who had not been legitimated by statutory process
to bring suit under the wrongful death act.
It might be added that where a posthumous illegitimate child is
116. 354 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. 1962).
117. See TENN.CODE ANN. § 20-607 (Supp. 1959).

118. Johnson v. Morgan, 184 Tenn. 254, 198 S.W.2d 549, 551 (1946); Heggie v.
Barley, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. 78 (Hamilton County Cir. Ct. 1914).
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-609 (1956).
120. TrEN. CODE ANN.§ 31-201 (1956).
121. Henderson v. Linston, 186 Tenn. 273, 209 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1947).
122. Adams v. Jackson, 23 Tenn. App. 118, 126 S.W.2d 899 (M.S. 1939).
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claiming benefits under the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation
Act,'2 he can recover. 2 4 The different result in this situation is due
to the fact that the Bastardy Act'2 makes an illegitimate child a dependent of its father, and this evidences the public policy that an
illegitimate child is to be
regarded as a "dependent" under the work126
men's compensation act.

V.

MISREPRESENTATION-LIABILITY

FOR NEGLIGENCE

One of the more significant decisions during the survey period was
Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga.127 There a partnership
of consulting engineers, Havens and Emerson, was employed by the
City of Chattanooga in connection with the design of a long sewage
tunnel through a hill known as Stringer's Ridge. The firm supplied
the city with drawings which purported to include the results of a
number of test borings. With regard to two of the borings near the
central part of the hill, however, the drawings omitted information
concerning the percentage of core recovery. The city solicited bids
for the work and gave the drawings to the successful prime contractor, who in turn showed it to the plaintiff, a sub-contractor for the
tunneling work. The plaintiff agreed to do the work for $106,384,
estimating its costs on the basis of the core recovery findings shown
on the drawings. Unanticipated costs in the amount of $17,730 were
incurred by the plaintiff when he encountered unexpected geological
formations necessitating rock blasting and diamond boring in place
of anticipated "fishtail' boring methods. The presence of the harder
materials would have been revealed if the chart prepared by Havens
and Emerson had revealed the results of the two borings at the
central part of the hill. The federal court found that the omission
on the drawings was not due to fraud but to "oversight or at most
simple and unintentional carelessness. . .

."'2

It nevertheless held,

acting as a trier of fact, that the action could be maintained against
the engineers who prepared the misleading drawings.
The defendants urged that traditionally the courts have required
scienter or fraudulent intent to support a deceit action. In that connection it is stated in the leading case of Shwab v. Waltersm, that
"an action for fraud and deceit differs from one brought for recission,
123. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-901 to -1028 (1956).
124. Shelley v. Central Woodwork, Inc., 207 Tenn. 411, 340 S.W.2d 896 (1960),
29 TENN. L. REv. 600 (1962).
125. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-223 (Supp. 1961).
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1013 (1956).

127. 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), 16 VAND. L. REv. 266 (1962).
128. Id. at 826.
129. 147 Tenn. 638, 251 S.W. 42 (1932).
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in that the plaintiff must prove in the former that the representation
was false and the person making it knew it to be false, while in the
latter the plaintiff need only to show that a misrepresentation was
made and it is immaterial whether made dishonestly or not."130 In
the present case, however, the court observed that the opinion in
Shwab v. Walters also quoted with approval the familiar statement
from Derry v. Peek131 that "fraud is proved when it is shown that a
false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without
belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or
false." It is pointed out in the present decision that the phrase
"recklessly, careless of whether it be true or false" is at least a step
in the direction of liability for negligent misrepresentation, representing "some concession in favor of such liability." 13
More definite support for the conclusion that actual intent to
deceive is not necessary in Tennessee was found in three cases involving negligently prepared title abstracts. 1' These cases were not
directly in point, since they involved suits for an accounting rather
than deceit actions, but as the court concludes, the "actual and substantial basis of these cases was negligence.... ."13 The court further
observes that a rule shielding the defendant from financial loss in
the absence of intent to deceive "has the seemingly unjustifiable
result of shielding from liability the defendant whose negligent statements result in financial ruin to the plaintiff, while holding fully
accountable the defendant whose similar statements result in personal
or property injury to the plaintiff."' It was urged that even if liability should be imposed in some cases
for negligent misrepresentation, the defendant should not be liable to
the plaintiff in this case for the reason that the misrepresentation was
not made directly to him but was received through two intermediaries, the city and the prime contractor. It was pointed out that under
a leading New York decision, UltramaresCorp. v. Touche,' m the court
declined to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation in a certified balance sheet which might be used in a wide range of transac137
tions. The court relied, however, on the Restatement of Torts,
which says that it is enough that "the harm is suffered . . . by one
of a class of persons for whose guidance the information is sup130. 147 Tenn. at 643, 251 S.W. at 44.
131. 14 App. Cas. 337, 375 (1889).. -132. 204 F. Supp. at 827.
133. Equitable Bldg. Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102
S.W. 901 (1907); Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S.W. 799 (1903);
Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890).
134. 204 F. Supp. at 829.
135. Id. at 830.
136. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
137. RESTATEwmET, TORTS § 522(b) (1) (1934).
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plied...." The court noted that thirty years have elapsed since the
decision in the Ultramares case, and that "the growing complexity of
business relations and the growing specialization of business functions
all require more and more reliance in business transactions upon the
representations of specialists." 138 Perhaps the Ultramares case could
have been distinguished on the ground that the defendant there
might, if held responsible, be exposed to 'liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,'13 while
in the present case only a single party would be the successful bidder
and suffer the unexpected loss in boring the tunnel.
It is believed that the earlier Tennessee title abstract cases, like
the Restatement, do not require that the defendant have in mind the
specific plaintiff, so long as the defendant knows that the abstract
will be used by a vendee as well as by the vendor who orders it.14
The recent decision in Howell v. Betts"'' likewise is consistent with
this federal case, for while it relieves a defendant who negligently
prepared a survey from liability, there the purchaser who suffered
loss bought the property twenty-four years later and was for that
reason "unforeseeable and remote."
The Texas Tunneling decision of course does not mean that liability
always will be incurred for negligent misrepresentation. The Restatement of Torts provision on which the court relies' 42 carefully
restricts this liability to information supplied in the course of one's
business or profession, and the harm must be suffered by a class of
persons for whom the information is supplied.
VI. DEFAMATION
A. Privilege in JudicialProceedings
There were two defamation cases during the survey period. Jones
v. Trice4 3 involved some basic points about the absolute privilege
in judicial proceedings. In an affidavit incorporated in a motion for
a new trial it was alleged that one Jones had been interested in the
outcome of the original trial, because he had a similar claim which
would be presented later. It was further asserted that Jones had
improperly influenced the jury at the trial. At a hearing on the motion
the defamatory accusations against Jones were withdrawn. In the
138. 204 F. Supp. at 833.
139. Cf. Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn.
678, 102 S.W. 910 (1907); Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S.W.
777 (1903).
140. See note 133 supra.
141. 362 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1962).
142. § 552 (1938).
143. 360 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1962).
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defamation suit, it was held that a demurrer was properly sustained
on the ground that the statement was absolutely privileged.
The first issue considered was whether the defamatory statement
was made in the course of judicial proceedings. In that connection
the court referred to an earlier case in which a statement contained
in an affidavit used to obtain the improper commitment of the plaintiff in an insanity proceeding'4 was regarded as in the course of
judicial proceedings. In applying that rule to the present case the
court said "it is immaterial whether
the affidavit is a separate writing
45
or is incorporated into the motion."
The opinion then dealt with the defense that the defamatory
statement was made about a person not a party to the judicial proceedings involved. It was held on that point, on the authority of
Crockett v. McClanahan,46 that it makes no difference that the alleged libel concerns a third party so long as the matter is pertinent
to a free judicial inquiry of the matter involved.
The major part of the opinion deals with the requirement that the
defamatory material must be "pertinent or relevant" to the proceedings. The court stated that these words "do not mean relevant within
the technical rules of evidence"'147 and found that the charges made
had a reasonable relationship to the motion for a new trial. Even
though the defamatory statements were withdrawn at the hearing
on the motion, the court found no basis in reason or authority for
xegarding this withdrawal as creating a "limitation or exception to the
privilege. " 14S
The opinion makes it clear that the privilege to make defamatory
statements in the course of judicial proceedings is an absolute one,
applying even where the statements are known to be false and are
published only to injure the plaintiff. The privilege extends to statements by judges, witnesses, counsel or parties.
B. Libel PerSe
In the other defamation decision, Venn v. Tennessean Newspapers,
a federal court had to deal with the intricacies of the law of
libel, including the doctrine of libel per se. It appeared that Venn,
engaged in advertising and publicity promotion, had arranged
several "talkathons" on behalf of Congressman Pat Sutton in his contest with Senator Kefauver for the Democratic nomination to the

149
Inc.,

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445 (1941).
360 S.W.2d at 50.
109 TenVi. 517, 72 S.W. 950 (1903).
360 S.W.2d at 54.
Ibid.
201 F. Supp. 47 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
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United States Senate. The Nashville Tennessean, which supported
Kefauver, published a series of articles which allegedly intimated that
Venn was "an associate both in business and social circles of criminals,
gangsters, mobsters, and other elements of the underworld, and
second, that plaintiff Venn in conducting the talkathon in the Sutton
campaign against Kefauver, was a 'tie-in' or connection between
Sutton and such criminal elements.... " 15o
The court found that two of the 'articles did contain accusations of
this sort and constituted libel per se because the defamatory reference
appeared "from the four corners of the article itself without reference
to other publications and without reference to extraneous facts."'15
Since these two articles were found to be actionable per se, Venn was
able to recover general damages without alleging special damages.
With reference to a number of other articles complained about, it
was found that these were "so ambiguous and uncertain in meaning
insofar as the plaintiff is concerned, that it must be held that they
are not libelous per se, and that an inneundo must be pleaded and
proved to establish a defamatory implication with respect to the
plaintiff." 5 2 It was further held that the plaintiff must plead and
prove special damages before recovering for those articles which were
only libelous per quod.
Originally the doctrine of libel per se referred simply to the rule
of pleading that if the words used in the writing complained of need
extrinsic facts to make them appear libelous, the plaintiff would fail
to establish any cause of action unless he pleads and proves these
facts.15 3 Later, however, there developed the concept that whenever
written words need extrinsic facts to make them appear defamatory,
the plaintiff must not only plead and prove the extrinsic facts, but
also must establish special damages. This doctrine has been criticized' 54 and seems to be based on a confusion between libel per se
and slander per se. 155 Be this as it may, the doctrine of libel per se
has now won considerable acceptance and was clearly adopted in
Tennessee many years ago in Continental National Bank v. Bowdre5 6
which was followed by the federal court in the present case.
It was further held in the Venn decision that the privilege of fair
150.
151.
152.
153.

(1960).

Id. at 50.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Note, Libel Per Se and Special Damages, 13 VAND. L. REv. 730, 731

154. See id. at 732; Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUm.
REv. 875, 900 (1949).
155. PNossEn, TORTS § 93, at 588 (2d ed. 1955). See also Hinson v. Pollock, 159
Tenn. 1, 15 S.W.2d 737 (1929), misinterpreting NmVELL, SLANDER AND LEL 36
(4th ed. 1924).
156. 92 Tenn. 723, 23 S.W. 131 (1893).
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comment did not apply because that privilege extends only to comment and not to misstatements of fact. The court observed in this
connection that the imputations that Venn moved in criminal circles
could not possibly be "classified as comments or57 expressions of views
or opinions upon a matter of public interest."'
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Nuisance
In Henegar v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.1 8 the
plaintiffs sued for damages for harm to their premises and personal
property from vapor, gas and smoke from the defendant's factory.
The suit, filed in December 1959, was for damages from a temporary
nuisance and the declaration was for harm suffered during the period
from October 1, 1957, to October 1, 1959; subsequently the plaintiffs'
declaration was amended to cover only the period from October 1,
1957, to October 1, 1958, and the loss of value for that period was
recovered. When a later action was brought for harm during the
period from October 1, 1958, to October 1, 1959, the trial judge's
action in sustaining a demurrer was upheld, on the ground that the
plaintiffs had fatally split their cause of action with reference to
damages suffered prior to the bringing of the first suit. Since the
right to recover damages up to October 1959 could have been litigated in the original action filed in December of that year, the first
judgment was res judicata as to all damages sustained up to the
time of the original suit. So while in an action for damages for a
temporary nuisance the plaintiff may bring successive actions for
future damages he "cannot arbitrarily select part of the past period,
sue for it, and then later sue for other parts of the same period."' 0
B. Inducing Breach of Contract
In Mefford v. City of Dupontonia,160 the complainant was supplying
water to some five hundred customers in Dupontonia. He had for
several years added a charge to his customers' water bills on account
of services rendered by him in helping maintain a sewer system
owned by the city. In 1959 the city passed an ordinance authorizing
itself to spend funds to maintain the sewer system. At the same time
it sent a circular to residents of the city advising them of the ordinance and saying there was no longer any need for them to pay a
157.
158.
159.
160.

201 F. Supp. at 56.
354 S.W.2d 69 (Tenn. 1962).
Id. at 70.
354 S.W.2d 823 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
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sewer maintenance charge to the complainant. Suit was brought for
an injunction and damages under the statute providing for treble
damages for inducing breach of contract. 161 The chancellor granted
the injunction but refused to allow damages, and this action was
sustained.
The court found that the statute prohibited interference with implied as well as formal contracts, but since the complainant's customers frequently had protested against the sewer charge by him, the
assent necessary to establish an implied contract to pay the disputed
charge was not established. Any quasi-contractual obligation to pay
for the complainant's service, "imposed by law, without assent," was
not regarded as a contract within the protection of the statute. It
was further held that in any event the city's action was privileged
162
because taken to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.
Furthermore, the city's action, since it was taken pursuant to an
ordinance, was regarded as governmental, with the result that it was
protected by the usual immunity applicable to governmental actions.
C. Damages
Two recent cases during the survey period involved the matter of
excessive damages. In Sappington v. Kilavos,'63 an automobile accident victim who was thrown into the steering wheel of his truck
suffered pain, aggravation of a duodenal ulcer, and severe recurring
headaches as a result of a spinal tap administered during treatment.
His special damages totaled $2,332. The jury returned a verdict for
$5,000, and the trial judge ordered a remittitur of $4,000. It is clear
that unless there is clear abuse of discretion the trial judge's action in
granting or refusing to grant a remittitur will not be set aside. 64 It
is not surprising, however, that the court found an abuse of discretion in this case and reduced the remittitur to $1,500, directing that
judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff for $3,500, an amount
which certainly does not seem excessive, in view of the special
damages.
The other case, Bell v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific
Ry., 165 involved a motorist injured at a railway crossing. Here there
was a five per cent permanent residual disability as a result of an
elbow injury. The special damages were $1,000. The jury returned a
verdict for $13,500. The federal judge was shocked at this amount
161. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1706 (1956).
162. REsTATEMENT, ToRTs § 770 (1934); Paossm, TOTS

1955).

§ 106, at 737 (2d ed.

163. 356 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961), 30 TENN. L. REv. 462 (1963).
164. Spence v. Came, 40 Tenn. App. 580, 292 S.W.2d 438 (1954).
165. 205 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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and stated on the record that he could not contemplate damages of
more than $5,000, exclusive of the special damages. There could be
no remittitur, however, because the court found that under constitutional provisions it was "not authorized to arbitrarily reduce the
amount of damages awarded by the jury, for so to do would deprive
the parties of their constitutional right to trial by jury .... "16 6 The
court did, however, order a new trial under rule 59 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that a mistake grave enough
to involve a "miscarriage of justice" had been committed, with resulting unjust enrichment of the plaintiff at the expense of the railroad. It would seem that the court's mention of a particular figure
as an appropriate maximum would be enough to facilitate settlement
of the case without the new trial.
166. Id. at 785.

